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Changing conceptions of the relation between organisms and their environments make
up a crucial chapter in the history of psychology. This may be approached by a
comparative study of how schematic diagrams portray this relation. Diagrams drive
the communication and the teaching of ideas, the sedimentation of epistemic norms
and methods of analysis, and in some cases the articulation of novel concepts through
pictographic variants. Through a sampling of schematic representations, I offer a concise
comparison of how different authors, with different interests and motivations, have
portrayed important aspects of the organism–environment relation. I compare example
diagrams according to the features they underscore (or omit) and group them into
classes that emphasize interaction, transaction, and constitution loops.
Keywords: organism–environment relation, diagrams, schematic representation, interaction, transaction,
constitution, enaction, ecological psychology
INTRODUCTION
There are important convergences between ecological psychology and enaction but also differences.
Some differences are due to historical accidents, as in the use of technical terms such as
information. Enactivists are cautious about information–talk because they build their theory in
opposition to notions of information traffic between agent and environment (although they do
not reject the use of information-theoretic methods, e.g., Aguilera and Di Paolo, 2019; see also
Beer and Williams, 2015). Ecological psychologists, in contrast, rely on a different concept of
ecological information as regularities in the ambient array that help specify affordances and guide
behavior (e.g., Reed, 1996). There are also differences in focus, with ecological psychology dealing
traditionally with explanations of perception and perceptual development, and enaction typically
more concerned with explanations of agency that do justice to human experience. Other differences
are conceptual. Some of these revolve around ways of conceiving the relation between organisms
and environments, conceptions that are rooted historically and not always spelled out.
In this article I look at a sampling of diagrams that express how different authors have
conceived of the relation between organism and environment through the history of psychology.
The exercise is limited but still helps to present a possible perspective according to which diagrams
may be grouped according to the type of relation they underscore: interaction, transaction, and
constitution loops.
Why look at diagrams instead of performing a well-documented textual analysis of the literature?
Both are needed. But diagrams are powerful in driving the communication and the teaching of
ideas. They help sediment perspectives and are one of the first tools used to approach new problems.
Diagrams simplify; they select and they omit. What they leave out or distort is part of the narratives
they help sustain (Tufte, 1997).
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I am mostly concerned with schematic rather than realistic
diagrams; pictorial simplifications that serve as conceptual
anchors, what Rudolf Arnheim (1969) describes as “thinking with
pure shapes.” They consist of simple elements: arrows conveying
influence, lines and surfaces conveying boundaries, enclosed
spaces conveying entities or processes, simple figures standing for
objects, and short labels.
Diagrammatic thinking can lead to pictographic formalisms,
as in the case of Feynman diagrams (Kaiser, 2005), Peirce’s
existential graphs (Roberts, 1973), and bond graphs in
engineering (Thoma, 1975). Most often, however, schematic
diagrams occupy some point in between the normative
sedimentation of ideas and the advance of novel thinking. Their
productivity need not take the shape of a full-blown formalism
and depends as much on the intellectual context as on the
expressiveness of its conventions. Kurt Lewin’s topological
diagrams in psychology1 (e.g., Lewin, 1936, 1938) show this, and
so do Neurath 1936’s Isotype, and Moore (2016) extensions to
the basic diagram of autopoiesis.
Some diagrams function as icons, others serve complex
narratives and try to leave few aspects unaccounted. Many fulfill
more than one function. Single depictions can afford close
examination as in, for example, Evan Thompson’s analysis of
Ernst Mach’s portrayal of his personal visual field (Thompson,
2007, pp. 280–82). Or a variety of illustrative diagrams can be put
together to explore full theoretical frameworks, as in Turvey and
Carello’s (1986) pictorial essay on ecological psychology. Here, I
want to focus on single diagrams in relation with each other in
order to uncover broad patterns and the ideas they convey.
The scope of this perspective is limited2 and the choice of
examples and groupings follows my interest in highlighting
three kinds of organism-environment relations: interaction,
transaction, and constitution loops. These terms are described
below. They are not meant as a novel categorization but as a
way of looking at differences in emphasis. And of course, a
diagram indicating relations of one of these types does not imply
that its author is unconcerned by relations of the other types.
The idea is to cautiously explore what diagrams suggest. The
same material may be interpreted through alternative lenses, e.g.,
the kind and complexity of the pictographic conventions, the
aesthetic dimension, or whether the emphasis is on structures or
on processes, to mention a few possibilities.
INTERACTION LOOPS
In almost every diagram that depicts organisms and their
environments, we find arrows going from one to the other.
Arrows convey influence and connection, and in most cases
1Lewin’s use of abstract diagrams is fundamental in the development of his
dynamical approach to psychology and deserves more extensive treatment than
we can provide here.
2Due to space and format constraints, only a small sample of 12 representative
diagrams is shown here. Other diagrams are mentioned briefly in the text.
All diagrams with the exception of Figure 1C have been (re)drawn by the
author with permission and following as closely as possible the original sources
(including placement of elements and types). Figures 1A,C,E are taken from the
public domain.
they form closed circuits to indicate that the relation between
organism and environment is one of reciprocal influence. Closed
loops are not a recent reaction to the classical “sandwich” model
of the mind (Hurley, 1998). Analogous criticisms have been
raised against simple stimulus-response thinking since the end
of the 19th century (e.g., Dewey, 1896). We see loops depicted
explicitly or implied in all of the diagrams in Figures 1, 2.
Having said that, it is important to remind ourselves that
open-loop explanations still abound in cognitive psychology and
cognitive neuroscience.
Formally, an interaction is a mutual coupling between two
dynamical systems. A system is coupled to another when its
parameters and constraints depend on the state of the other
system. The coupling is mutual if the same situation obtains in
both directions. The environment of any given system is defined
in dynamical terms as the set of all external variables to which
the system is coupled and the sets of all external parameters it
influences. Crucially, while the states of coupled systems change
during interaction, the sets of variables, parameters, and formal
relations do not change.
An important antecedent for both enaction and ecological
psychology that describes this situation is Jakob von Uexküll’s
depiction of the functional circle of an organism (Figure 1A;
Von Uexküll and Kriszat, 1934, p. 7). The diagram shows
a circuit going from an organism’s receptor organs to its
effectors and closed by an external object. The character of the
perceived environment is organism-dependent and constitutive
of its inner world (Innenwelt). It depends, in particular on what
actions the organism is capable of performing and what it is
sensitive to, respectively, its Wirkungswelt and Merkwelt, as well
as on the possibilities afforded by the object (Mekrmalträger
and Wirkungsträger). The diagram presents on a same plane
objective and subjective aspects of action/perception and serves
to buttress von Uexküll’s concept of the Umwelt, the surrounding
world of an organism.
A different attempt to establish the relation between the
objective and subjective aspects of behavior was introduced by
Koffka (1935, p. 40; Figure 1B). The diagram lacks von Uexküll’s
elegant simplicity. The geographical (objective) environment
(G) affects the real organism (RO), within which a relation
is established between real behavior (RB, feeding back to G),
phenomenal behavior (PHB), and the behavioral environment
(BE). Koffka intends to illustrate the structure of the life space
but the diagram is imperfect. Kurt Lewin (1936, 77) criticized its
confusing conventions, such as the relation between real behavior
(shown as an area), which takes place within the behavioral
environment (shown as a line), yet is depicted as separate
from it. Koffka’s points may be valid, e.g., the fact that not all
action and perception processes are phenomenally conscious. But
condensing such complex ideas in a line drawing is difficult.
Simpler diagrams, like von Uexküll’s, travel further at the risk of
blurring nuances.
Simplicity here is meant conceptually. Figure 1C shows
a well-known illustration from Descartes’ Treatise on Man
(Descartes, 1998, 154). Despite the artistic portrayal of a human
body, it counts as a simple diagram. One source of bodily
movement is the stimulation of the sense organs, which in turn
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FIGURE 1 | (A) von Uexküll’s functional circle. (B) Koffka’s depiction of the behavioral and geographical environment. (C) Descartes’ representation of a
stimulation-action cycle. (D) Gibson’s depiction of lawful changes in the ambient array as a result of moving the observer. (E) Barker’s eco-behavioral circuits.
(F) Beer’s iconic diagram of brain, body, and environment as coupled dynamical systems. See text for references.
induces activity in the pineal gland; from there a flow of spirits
to the muscles activate a motor reaction. This is illustrated by the
two positions of the arm, by the lawful relation between object
and retinal stimulation, and by the internal circuit from eyes to
brain to muscles. Formally, the diagram is a less abstract version
of von Uexküll’s functional circle (Figure 1A), yet the intended
meaning is quite different: one supports a mechanistic view where
the body, like an automaton, is activated through stimulation
(and other sources of activity in the pineal gland); the other
conveys an inescapable subjective dimension of perception.
Descartes diagram is visually similar to a famous picture
that Gibson (1986, p. 72; see also Gibson, 1963) used to make
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yet another different point (Figure 1D). Gibson was interested
in moving beyond the special case of the static perceiver.
Motion of the observation point reveals structural properties
in the ambient array that are absent in the static case, such as
variations in solid angles, changes in occlusions, and so on. As
the array changes, some features and relations remain invariant.
We see two stages in the motion of the whole body, from sitting
to standing. This and similar diagrams have been used extensively
in ecological psychology, e.g., to highlight the enabling effects of
developmental changes (e.g., Adolph and Hoch, 2019, p. 144).
Unlike Figure 1C, the internal arc of the sensorimotor loop
remains implicit, while complex visual relations within the
environment are shown explicitly. Pictorially, the requirements
of depicting a body situated in an everyday environment and the
lawful effects of motion on sensation are jointly met by replacing
the whole head by the cross-section of a disproportionately large
eye where light rays are inverted (as in Descartes’ diagram).
Figures 1E,F lie at opposite ends of representational
complexity. Figure 1F is a well-known, iconic diagram produced
by Randall Beer (e.g., Beer and Chiel, 2008; Figure 1)
describing the reciprocal coupling between organism and
environment. As in other cases (e.g., Warren, 2006, p. 367),
its purpose is to support the formulation of mathematical
expressions functionally connecting variables in the agent and the
environment. The environment is depicted as surrounding the
whole agent. Unlike other versions of the same diagram, a thicker
line has been drawn around the square indicating the body.
This highlights a certain unity of the agent within which two
interactive systems have been indicated, the nervous system and
the (rest of the) body. Context here is important. Beer has been
using diagrams like this since the early 1990s (e.g., Beer, 1992) to
accentuate the dynamic nature of each of the shaded areas and the
notion that in principle none of them determines what goes on
in the others. This contrasts with mainstream notions of staged
processing prevalent in cognitivist and connectionist approaches.
It also contrasts with the view that the brain controls the body as
a puppeteer does. Moreover, the diagram conveys a subtler point:
the whole organism, not its nervous system, interacts with the
environment. The nervous system is not directly coupled with the
environment, but indirectly and always through the body. This
makes all the difference if we conceive the body as a dynamical
system and not merely as a signal transductor.
Another interaction loop is shown in Roger Barker’s diagram
(Figure 1E). It comes from his theory of behavior settings
(Barker, 1968, p. 139) and depicts an organism engaged in various
eco-behavioral circuits. The organism appears at the bottom
of the large circles and is divided into peripheral receptors
and effectors and central processes, in a way reminiscent of
von Uexküll’s Merknetz and Wirknetz. Unlike von Uexküll’s
single object, Barker shows various complex processes in the
environment: relations between agent and objects (small circles,
diamonds, and rectangles) both at the proximal level (e.g., a
behavior such as catching a ball in a ball game) and ecological
level (e.g., the playing field, other players). This diagram is
animated by a richness of interactions between objects and even
the dynamic character of the organism is underlined by a series
of small arrows. In terms of the proportion of the loop occupied
by the agent, Barker’s and von Uexküll’s diagrams are almost
opposites. For Barker, the organism occupies a short segment in
much larger loops that include many environmental processes.
This is a suitable representation of his contention that when
accounting for what groups of people do in everyday life, the
behavior setting is usually the strongest determinant.
All of these examples show interaction loops in the
sense that they do not explicitly depict any permanent
change in the organization or structure of the systems
involved. Such possibilities are not disallowed, but they are not
emphasized either.
TRANSACTION LOOPS
Interaction loops are well-defined if the systems are well-
defined. We are often, however, interested in how systems
change. Once we allow organisms and environments to change
structurally as a result of their engagement, the notion of
interactive coupling becomes fuzzy as systems undergo a
history of transformations. Variables and parameters may
appear or disappear, functional relations may change. Such a
history is better described by the concept of transaction (e.g.,
Dewey and Bentley, 1949), a situation where labels are only
provisional as relations and processes undergo transformation.
In developmental psychology, transactional models stress “the
plastic character of the environment and of the organism as
an active participant in its own growth” (Sameroff, 2009, 8).
If systems may change, how do they sustain their identity?
Maturana and Varela (1987) propose a distinction between
organization (a set of formal relations) and structure (an actual
instantiation of those relations) and suggest that the criterion of
sameness is the conservation of organization even when structure
changes, a process they define as structural coupling. We can
then define transaction loops as processes of structural coupling
whereby an agent’s organization is maintained but structures in
the agent and the environment undergo a history of mutually
enabled changes.
Figure 2A is a depiction of an ultrastable system, a concept
developed by Ashby (1960, p. 83). The environment (Envt) is
in a two-way coupling with the behavior generating sub-system
(R) of the organism. Two other elements are shown that also
belong to the organism: a set of parameters (S) that modulate the
dynamics of R and a “gauge” indicating the state of organism’s
essential variables, i.e., variables that must be kept within viability
bounds for the organism to survive. A secondary feedback circuit
connects all the elements in the diagram. An arrow from the
environment to the gauge shows the effect of environmental
states on the essential variables. An arrow from the essential
variables to S indicates the triggering conditions that lead to
changing the behavior control parameters. If changes in S affect
R in such a way that essential variables at the viability boundary
return to a safe zone, the system will have adapted to a new
situation. Through this double feedback the organism undergoes
a history of adaptive changes, i.e., a series of transactions. While
the secondary, transactional, feedback is not operating, the first
feedback instantiates a simple interaction loop.
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FIGURE 2 | (A) Ashby’s ultrastable system. (B) Thompson’s depiction of internal processes in organisms with a nervous system. (C) Bateson’s conception of a
self-constitution loop. (D) Iconic representation of a self-constituting autopoietic system (left) and enactive agent (right). (E) Plessner’s distinction between nominal
(I), reified (II), and processual (III) boundary between body and medium. (F) A sensorimotor scheme composed of three agent-environment coordination patterns.
See text for references.
Transactional relations are sometimes conveyed by describing
the classes of processes at play. A typical diagram used in
the enactive literature is Figure 2B (Thompson, 2007, p. 47).
Similar diagrams appear in ecological psychology (e.g., Gibson,
1963, p. 12). A rather absent environment may be regarded
as this diagram’s fault (contrast with Figure 1E or with an
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extended version in Chemero, 2009, p. 153). This diagram
expresses the circular relations between processes within an
agent with a nervous system, something deemed applicable to
any environmental situation. The environment is the blank
background from which arrows emerge carrying perturbations
to the agent and sink carrying its responses. Other versions of
this diagram (e.g., Varela, 1984, p. 319) add some symmetry
and show the environment as an additional circle on the left.
But Figure 2B is interesting in a perhaps unintended way.
Read critically, diagrams like this may demonstrate a lack of
attention toward environmental processes (cf. Barker’s diagram).
Read more charitably, we should notice a broken convention
in the use of arrows. Shortcutting semiotic levels, they point
toward the diagram’s own background and not to another
graphic element on the same plane. We may take this to
signify a sense of inescapable environmental immersion. That
diagrams may be assessed critically for their omissions or
charitably for their subtlety underscores their semantic openness.
Interpretation can reveal meanings intended implicitly, but also
unintended meanings from which we can nevertheless draw
interesting implications.
Looked at closely, even a sensorimotor scheme can count as
a transaction loop although it involves only a behavioral scale
typically conceived as interactive. Each segment in Figure 2F
(Di Paolo et al., 2017, p. 85) stands for a joint coordination
between organism and environment. Each coordination leads
to a bodily and environmental situation that gives rise to the
next coordination in the cycle. Coordination patterns are labeled,
following Piaget, as AxA′, BxB′, CxC′, where A, B, and C are
the bodily supporting processes (e.g., breathing, suckling, and
swallowing when a baby is drinking from a milk bottle) and
A′, B′, and C′ the supporting environmental processes (e.g., air,
bottle, milk). Each coordination induces a transformation of the
organism-environment relation such that at its end, the next
coordination starts as a result. Each coordination thus fulfills
functional and structural roles, and this fulfillment results from a
history of past and ongoing equilibration. Unlike other diagrams,
we see pure relations between organism and environment
(bands that converge into an arrow segment), without explicitly
schematizing either.
CONSTITUTION LOOPS
We may sometimes be concerned not just with the historical
transformation of organism and environment but with their very
production, the coemergence of an individual together with its
associated milieu (Simondon, 2005). If this is an ongoing process,
as enactivists sustain, the continued existence of the organism
as an entity must be the result of relations of constitution,
i.e., relations by which organisms and environments co-emerge.
These loops will often have a transactional character, but not
all transactions entail relations of constitution which include
organizational and as well as structural changes.
The meaning of arrows and closed shapes in most diagrams
is usually straightforward. Arrows go from an “entity”
(a closed shape) toward another “entity” or toward a relation
(another arrow) in the case of modulatory couplings. The
autopoiesis diagram (Figure 2D, left; Maturana and Varela,
1987, 74) re-signifies this convention: an arrow closes on itself
forming a closed shape to indicate an entity constituted by
circular relations between processes. This dialectical synthesis
of conventions for entities and relations (circles and arrows)
describes a constitution loop. The diagram has been adapted
and extended many times, e.g., to illustrate ideas of minimal,
sensorimotor, and linguistic agency, and social interaction3
(Di Paolo et al., 2018, pp. 54, 68, 197; see also Moore, 2016). For
the enactive concept of agency (Figure 2D, right; Di Paolo et al.,
2018, p. 54) modulatory arrows have been added that go from the
self-constituting organism toward the environmental coupling,
not toward the environment. This secondary loop may be seen as
a generalization of Ashby’s ultrastable system. Gray lines indicate
material exchanges that constitute the organism. They can also
undergo regulation by the agent. The circle is not fully closed to
signal that the agent is constantly in the process of making itself
also through its actions.
The convention of the self-encircling arrow to indicate a
constitution loop has been used before by Gregory Bateson
(Figure 2C; Ruesch and Bateson, 1951, pp. 187, 189). Formally,
if we ignore the dashed lines, this diagram and the autopoiesis
diagram are identical, the only differences being the horizontal
orientation, the fact that the circle describing the organism
(“an entity with a self-correcting causal circuit,” p. 186) does
not fully close on itself, and the missing wavy line, replaced
by the label “environment” on the right. What distinguishes
Bateson’s diagram is a dashed rectangle conveying the idea that
the personal sense of “self ” often combines both organismic
and environmental processes and that parts of the body may
sometimes be felt as belonging outside ourselves (thus also
labeled “environment,” although this may cause confusion) and
parts of our “self ” include processes in the body’s environment
(e.g., wearing glasses).
The idea of a self-producing entity that is itself constituted
by the way it relates to its medium, though perfectly conceivable
in scientific terms, is difficult to picture. In Figure 2E, Helmuth
Plessner presents a comparison between views of the relation
between body and medium (Plessner, 2019, p. 183; originally
published in 1928). Inset I indicates a nominal boundary
between body and medium (dashed line); interaction arrows
freely transverse it in both directions. Inset II illustrates the
boundary as a reified barrier, suggesting a domain of constitution
on the left and a domain of interactions on the right, an
idea similar to the doctrine of non-intersecting domains in
the theory of autopoiesis. Inset III illustrates two coupled
process arcs of construction and disintegration out of which
both body and medium reciprocally constitute and distinguish
themselves. The organism as a whole is “only half of its life”
and demands environmental “supplementation without which
it would perish” (Plessner, 2019, p. 180), a fundamental tension
3To clarify, social interactions, according to their operational definition in enactive
terms (De Jaegher and Di Paolo, 2007), can and usually do comprise interaction,
transaction, and constitution loops. They are not only interactive in the restricted
sense used here even if, for reasons of continuity with social psychology and social
science, they are labeled as social interactions.
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between openness and separation. The dialectical situation is
reminiscent of Simondon’s (2005) philosophy of individuation
and the enactive conception of life (Di Paolo, 2018).
DISCUSSION
This brief excursion does not exhaust the lessons we could draw
from a more detailed comparison of schematic diagrams in
psychology. More points can be made; more diagrams can be
discussed. But it does produce some insights.
Pictorial or formal resemblance does not ensure that diagrams
are used to make similar points, as we have seen in comparing
Descartes’ diagram with von Uexküll’s and Gibson’s. It seems
legitimate to ask whether similarity of representation might not
sometimes suggest tacit convergences that are neither avowed nor
rejected. Perhaps Descartes would not have entirely dismissed
the dynamic interpretations in von Uexküll’s diagram, perhaps
it makes some sense to link Gibson’s depiction of the observer
in motion with von Uexküll functional cycle more explicitly (see
Baggs and Chemero, 2018). Comparing diagrams can suggest
novel interpretations and bring implicit ideas into the open.
There is a conceptual and practical distinction between
interaction, transaction, and constitution loops even if some
diagrams may ambiguously belong in more than one category.
Establishing the timescale of interest may help in determining
whether a situation is best treated as interactional (e.g.,
behavior) or transactional (e.g., learning and development).
But this is not the only difference. Transactions do not only
occur at longer timescales, and even when they do, their
effects can still make a difference in the here and now
of action and perception (like jumps in skill). Constitution
loops are meant to describe how organisms are themselves
always individuated through processes that constantly create
the distinction between organism and environment. Their
diagrammatic representation in self-encircling arrows graphically
transcends the entity/relation distinction.
We may tentatively suggest that one difference between
ecological psychology and enaction is that the former focuses
more intensively on interaction and transaction loops, and
the latter on transaction and constitution loops. This is only
approximate and there are bound to be counterexamples
(as in Randall Beer’s case, who has worked on models of
interaction as well as models to clarify ideas of transaction
and constitution in autopoiesis and enaction, e.g., Beer, 2020).
Nor is there any implication that the situation must stay
like this. But the suggestion may act as common ground
in discussing the differences between the two approaches as
well as pointing to transaction loops as a fertile zone for
collaborative work.
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